Western Surety Company v. Idaho Auto Auction : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2009
Western Surety Company v. Idaho Auto Auction :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Bond and Call, L.C.; Vancott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy; Attorneys for Appellant.
Anthony R. Martineau; Plant, Christensen & Kanell, P.C.; Durham Jones & Pinegar; Richer &
Overholt, P.C.; Attorneys for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Western Surety Company v. Idaho Auto Auction, No. 20090618 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1797
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v s . • • • • ' . > 
IDAHO AUTO AUCTION, > 
BRIGHTON BANK, GREATER > 
NEVADA AUTO AUCTION, UTAH : 
AUTO AUCTION, T.S. RIDEOUT, : 
INC. DBA COTTONWOOD : 
MOTORS, NATHAN COULTER, ' 
SANDRA COULTER, PEDRO BOIX, ' 
SILVIA BOIX, MICHAEL ', 
TOSCANO, TELISA TOSCANO, and 
DOES 1-100, : 
Defendants/Appellents. ; 
) No. 20090618 CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
MICHAEL TOSCANO and TELISA TOSCANO 
On Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County 
Case No. 050906722, Honorable Joseph C. Fratto 
BOND AND CALL, L.C. VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & 
Budge Call MCCARTHY 
8 East Broadway, Suite 720 , John A. Snow (3025) 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Robert H. Scott (10981) 
36 South State Street, Suite 1900 
D. Bruce Oliver Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
L.LongLawyer (801)532-3333 
343 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 Attorneys for Appellant 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
DEC 042009 
Anthony R. Martineau 
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
PLANT, CHRJSTENSEN & KANELL, 
P.C. 
John N. Braithwaite 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
Richard M. Hymas 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
RICHER & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
Arnold Richer 
901 West Baxter Drive 
South Jordan, UT 84095 
Attorneys for Appellee 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED 
651 :417557v3 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, ; 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
IDAHO AUTO AUCTION, 
BRIGHTON BANK, GREATER ': 
NEVADA AUTO AUCTION, UTAH 
AUTO AUCTION, T.S. RIDEOUT, 
INC. DBA COTTONWOOD 
MOTORS, NATHAN COULTER, : 
SANDRA COULTER, PEDRO BOIX, : 
SILVIA BOIX, MICHAEL ; 
TOSCANO, TELISA TOSCANO, and : 
DOES 1-100, ; 
Defendants/Appellants. ; 
) No. 20090618 CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
MICHAEL TOSCANO and TELISA TOSCANO 
On Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County 
Case No. 050906722, Honorable Joseph C. Fratto 
BOND AND CALL, L.C. 
Budge Call 
8 East Broadway, Suite 720 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
D. Bruce Oliver 
L. Long Lawyer 
343 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 Attorneys for Appellant 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & 
MCCARTHY 
John A. Snow (3025) 
Robert H.Scott (10981) 
36 South State Street, Suite 1900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801)532-3333 
6 S 1 -417*;«;7w"3 
Anthony R. Martineau 
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
PLANT, CHR1STENSEN & KANELL, 
P.C. 
John N. Braithwaite 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
Richard M. Hymas 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
RICHER & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
Arnold Richer 
901 West Baxter Drive 
South Jordan, UT 84095 
Attorneys for Appellee 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED 
Appellants Michael and Telisa Toscano submit this Brief of Appellants in support 
of their appeal of the orders and judgment of the Third District Court for Salt Lake 
County, Utah entered in favor of Appellee Nathan Coulter. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 6 
A. Factual Background Of Claims That Gave Rise To The Lawsuit 6 
B. History Of The Default 8 
C. Significance Of The Errors Made By Coulter And The Trial Court 10 
D. The Judgment Is Void Because the Cross Claim Fails To State A Claim.. 12 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 13 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 20 
ARGUMENT. 22 
I. THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD BE SET ASIDE BECAUSE COULTER 
AND THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW THE RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE IN ENTERING THE DEFAULT CERTIFICATE AND 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 22 
A. Coulter Failed To Follow The Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure In Seeking 
The Default Certificate And The Default Judgment By Failing To Serve 
The Default Papers On The Toscanos' Counsel 22 
1. The Trial Court erred by ruling that a party who has appeared by 
answering the complaint has not appeared for purposes related to a 
cross-claim in the same action 23 
2. Coulter failed to follow Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 5 which 
requires that all papers be served upon counsel for a party who has 
appeared in the case through counsel 25 
3. Coulter's failure to follow Utah R. Civ. P. 5 renders the default 
judgment void and requires that it be set aside 27 
i 
C-C i . j n - » r n . . i 
B. The Default Judgment Was Invalid Because Coulter and the Trial Court 
Failed To Follow The Two-Step Process For Entry Of Default Judgment 
Set Forth In Utah R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) 29 
C. The Toscanos Were Prejudiced By The Failure Of Coulter and the Trial 
Court To Follow The Rules Of Civil Procedure 30 
II. THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT MUST BE SET ASIDE BECAUSE IT IS BASED 
UPON A CROSS CLAIM THAT FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM AGAINST 
THE TOSCANOS 33 
A. The Cross Claim Fails To State A Claim Against The Toscanos 33 
B. Even If The Trial Court Were Inclined To Construe The Cross Claim To 
State A Claim Against The Toscanos, It Should Have Considered Other 
Facts Necessary To Insure An Appropriate Judgment 35 
CONCLUSION 37 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Board of Educ. v. Cox, 384 P.2d 806 (Utah 1963) 2 
Burge v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 933 P.2d 210 N.M. 1996 37 
Dennis Garberg & Assocs. v. Pack-Tech Jnt'l Corp., 115 F.3d 767 (10th Cir. 1997) 31 
Deutz-Allis Credit Corp. v. Smith, 785 P.2d 682 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990) 3, 27, 29 
Erickson v. Schenkers Jnt'l Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1994) 33 
Express Recovery Servs. v. Shewell, 171 P.3d 451 (Utah Ct. App. 2007) 36 
Fibro Trust, Inc. v. Brahman Fin., Inc., 974 P.2d 288 (Utah 1999) 1 
Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 311 P.2d 189 (Utah 1962) 32 
Helgesen v. Inyangumia, 636 P.2d 1079 (Utah 1981) 32 
Lundv. Brown, 11 P.3d 277 (Utah 2000) passim 
McGarvin-Moberly Constr. Co. v. Welden, 897 P.2d 1310 (Wyo. 1995) 36 
McKean v. Mountain View Memorial Estates, 411 P.2d 129 (Utah 1966) 32, 33 
New YorkLife.Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137 (5th Cir. La. 1996) 23, 27, 28 
Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932 (Utah 1998) 29, 34 
Pitts v. Pine Meadow Ranch, 589 P.2d 767 (Utah 1978) 2 
Plaza del Lago Townhomes Ass'n v. Highwood Builders, LLC, 148 P.3d 367 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 2006) 23 
Radioear Corp. v. Crouse, 547 P.2d 546 (Idaho 1976) 30 
Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co., 817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 27 
Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984) 1,29 
Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790 (Utah 1986) 34 
Skanchyv. Calcados Ortope SA, 952 P.2d 1071 (Utah 1998) 2, 33, 35 
iii 
651 :417557v3 
Sonus Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 61 F.R.D. 644 (D. Mass. 1974) 31 
Stevens v. Collard, 837 P.2d 593 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 34 
Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 
1975) 32 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) 1 
Other Authorities 
Utah Standards of Professionalism and Civility, Rule 16 26 
Rules 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 31 
Rule 55(b)(2) 17,22 
Utah R. Civ. P. 4 24 
Utah R. Civ. P. 5 passim 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54 5 
Utah R. Civ. P. 55 passim 
Utah R. Civ. P. 59 5 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60 passim 
Utah R. Civ. P. 75 4 
iv 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j), as this 
matter has been transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue on this appeal is whether the Trial Court erred in failing to set aside a 
default judgment that was deficient in several respects. One set of defects relates to the 
failure of the appellee, Nathan Coulter, ("Coulter") and the Trial Court to follow Utah R. 
Civ. P. 5 and 5.5 in seeking and entering the default. Specifically, Coulter did not 
properly serve the request for default and related papers (the "default papers") on the 
appellants Michael and Telisa Toscano ("the "Toscanos") and the Trial Court did not 
hold a hearing to determine damages prior to entering the default judgment. Both of 
these flaws deprived the Toscanos of notice that default was being sought. The second 
set of flaws relate to the fact that the default is based upon a cross claim (the "Cross-
Claim") that does not state a claim against the Toscanos. Each of the deficiencies 
provides an independent reason to set aside the judgment. 
Although this case involves a motion to set aside a default, it turns largely on 
issues that are not within the Trial Court's discretion. The Trial Court does not have 
discretion to deviate from the Rules of Civil Procedure, even when addressing a party in 
default. Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Utah 1984). Therefore, the Trial 
Court's application of and adherence to the Rules of Civil Procedure should be reviewed 
for correctness. Fibro Trust, Inc. v. Brahman Fin., Inc., 974 P.2d 288, 295 (Utah 1999) 
(proper application of law reviewed for correctness). Moreover, a default judgment 
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based on a cross claim that fails to state a claim is invalid. Skanchy v. Calcados Ortope 
SA, 952 P.2d 1071, 1076 (Utah 1998). The Trial Court has no discretion in determining 
whether to set aside an invalid judgment. 
If this Court rules that the default judgment is void but the default certificate is 
not*, then the Trial Court erred by not considering whether to set aside the default 
certificate under the "good cause" standard of Utah R. Civ. P. 55(c). However, because 
this case is clear cut, it would be an abuse of discretion to not set aside the default 
certificate for good cause. 
The decision of whether to set aside a default is largely within the discretion of the 
Trial Court. Pitts v. Pine Meadow Ranch, 589 P.2d 767, 769 (Utah 1978). This 
discretion should be exercised liberally in favor of the defaulting party in order to provide 
him his day in court.2 Id. "It is an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a default 
judgment where there is reasonable justification for the defendants' failure to . . . 
answer." Board of Educ. v. Cox, 384 P.2d 806, 807 (Utah 1963). In addition, because 
1
 This potential result can be reached only in limited circumstances. Specifically, if the 
Court finds that there was no error in Coulter's failure to serve the default papers on the 
Toscanos' counsel, and that the Cross-Claim does state a claim, but that the Trial Court 
did err in entering a default judgment prior to holding a hearing to determine damages 
and giving the Toscanos notice of that hearing, the proper result may be to set aside the 
judgment and not the certificate. Under this outcome, fairness would require that the 
Toscanos be given opportunity to set aside the default certificate under the "good cause" 
standard of Utah R. Civ. P. 55(c). 
2
 The interests of the plaintiffs should also be taken into consideration, and the court 
should take care not to work an injustice or inequity to them. Pitts, 589 P.2d at 769. 
Pitts involved a case in which the plaintiff had relocated to England and would have been 
severely inconvenienced by being required to come to the United States to litigate the 
matter. Id. at 768. The record in this case states no reason why it would be unjust to 
require Coulter to prove his claims. 
£ C 1 •A'\7KKml\i1 
2 
this case involves a failure to follow the procedures for notice when seeking a default, the 
Trial Court's discretion should be limited. See Deutz-Allis Credit Corp. v. Smith, 785 
P.2d 682, 684 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990)("a court's usual discretionary authority to grant or 
deny [a motion to set aside a default] may be greatly narrowed where certain procedural 
safeguards were not strictly complied with in obtaining the judgment"). Therefore, even 
if this Court were to conclude that the only reversible error was the Trial Court's failure 
to consider the good cause standard, this Court should simply remand with directions to 
set aside both the default judgment and certificate. 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
This case turns on application of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 5, 55 and 60. The 
relevant subsections of those rules are stated below. 
1. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 5(a) and (b) provide, in relevant part as 
follows: 
(a) Service: When required. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in these rules or as otherwise directed by the 
court, every judgment, every order required by its terms to be served, every pleading 
subsequent to the original complaint, every paper relating to discovery, every written 
motion other than one heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand, 
offer of judgment, and similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties. 
(2) No service need be made on parties in default except that: . . . (B) a party in 
default for any reason other than for failure to appear shall be served with all pleadings 
and papers; (C) a party in default for any reason shall be served with notice of any 
3 
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hearing necessary to determine the amount of damages to be entered against the 
defaulting party; 
(b) Service: How made. 
(1) If a party is represented by an attorney service shall be made upon the 
attorney unless service upon the party is ordered by the court. If an attorney has filed a 
Notice of Limited Appearance under Rule 75 and the papers being served relate to a 
matter within the scope of the Notice, service shall be made upon the attorney and the 
party. 
2. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 55 (a) through (e) provide, in relevant part, 
as follows: 
(a) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is 
sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is 
made to appear the clerk shall enter the default of that party. 
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows: 
(1) By the clerk. Upon request of the plaintiff the clerk shall enter 
judgment for the amount claimed and costs against the defendant if: (A) the 
default of the defendant is for failure to appear; (B) the defendant is not an infant 
or incompetent person; (C) the defendant has been personally served pursuant to 
Rule 4(d)(1); and (D) the claim against the defendant is for a sum certain or for a 
sum that can be made certain by computation. 
651 :417557v3 
(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by 
default shall apply to the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court to enter 
judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to 
determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by 
evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct 
such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and proper. 
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown the court may set aside an 
entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside 
in accordance with Rule 60(b). 
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this rule 
apply whether the party entitled to the judgment by default is a plaintiff, a third-party 
plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases a 
judgment by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c). 
3. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), provides, in part, for relief from 
default judgments as follows: 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; 
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been 
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether 
heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of 
5 
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an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, 
or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise 
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. 
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not 
more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action 
to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for 
fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by 
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Factual Background Of Claims That Gave Rise To The Lawsuit. 
Pedro Boix was the owner of an automobile dealership known as Auto One. From 
early 2003 to February, 2004, Michael Toscano was a co-owner of Auto One along with 
Mr. Boix.3 In or about February, 2004, Mr. Toscano resigned his position with Auto 
One. Around the time of Mr. Toscano's resignation, Mr. Boix asked Sandra Coulter, 
3 Telisa Toscano has never been an owner or employee of Auto One. She was a signer 
on the Auto Owners bond at issue before the Trial Court. Similarly, though it does not 
appear Nathan Coulter was ever an owner of Auto One, he was also a signer on the bond 
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who was married to Nathan Coulter, to be his co-owner in Auto One.4 Nathan Coulter 
gave or loaned substantial sums of money to Pedro Boix in conjunction with his wife's 
involvement in Auto One. 
As owner of Auto One, Pedro Boix defrauded a number of people and then fled 
the United States on or about September of 2004.5 Western Surety, which had issued a 
payment bond on behalf of Auto One, filed a lawsuit interpleading bond funds and 
asserting claims for indemnification against Pedro Boix, Sylvia Boix, the Toscanos, 
Nathan Coulter and Sandra Coulter. The Toscanos appeared through counsel, D. Bruce 
Oliver, and answered the complaint. Coulter subsequently answered and asserted a cross 
claim against the Toscanos and Pedro and Sylvia Boix. The Toscanos and their counsel 
overlooked the Cross-Claim and did not answer it. 
The Cross-Claim contained eleven numbered paragraphs. It mentioned various 
causes of action, though it did not set forth the elements of any cause of action in any 
coherent or organized fashion, if it states them at all. Though it mentioned fraud, unjust 
enrichment and conversion, it clearly did not state the elements of these causes of action. 
The only cause of action for which the elements are even arguably stated is breach of 
contract. However, this cause of action only alleges that money was loaned to Auto One. 
4
 Coulter may dispute whether his wife actually became a partner with Boix. However, 
his testimony on the record indicates that he and his wife had understood she would 
become Mr. Boix's partner in the future. 
5
 The Toscanos were not involved in Mr. Boix's fraud. The Toscanos do not know 
whether Sandra Coulter was involved in Pedro Boix's frauds. Mr. Boix's activities are 
mostly immaterial to this appeal. 
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It does not allege that money was loaned to the Toscanos. Therefore, it does not state a 
claim against the Toscanos. 
The Toscanos and Coulter unsuccessfully defended themselves against Western 
Surety's claim. Summary judgment was entered in favor of Western Surety on the 
indemnification claim. The Toscanos retained the law firm of VanCott, Bagley, 
Cornwall and McCarthy to represent them on the appeal of the judgment in favor of 
Western Surety. Though a notice of appeal was filed, the Toscanos ultimately settled 
with Western Surety and a satisfaction of judgment was entered with respect to those 
claims. 
B. History Of The Default 
The default involves a long and somewhat complicated procedural history. 
Nonetheless, because that history is important to understanding the matters on appeal, it 
will be repeated here. 
Approximately two and one-half years after filing the cross claim and several 
months after the Toscanos and Coulter satisfied the judgments against them, Coulter 
sought a default against the Toscanos on the Cross-Claim. Though he had been in 
contact with the Toscanos shortly before seeking the default, he did not inquire regarding 
their failure to answer. Similarly, though the Toscanos had appeared through counsel, 
Coulter's counsel did not attempt to contact the Toscanos' counsel. For unknown 
reasons, Coulter's counsel chose to mail the default papers only to a residential address 
for the Toscanos. This address was incorrect. Though a default judgment was entered on 
8 
February 65 2008, the Toscanos did not receive the default papers for approximately four 
to eight weeks after this date. 
Upon receiving these papers, the Toscanos contacted their attorneys at the 
VanCott firm. Due to several miscommunications and uncertainty regarding the nature 
of Coulter's claims upon which the default was based, the Toscanos did not file a motion 
to set aside the default judgment until May 12, 2008. That motion was based upon Utah 
R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). However, the Trial Court ruled that that motion should have been 
filed under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), and that it was therefore time barred because it was 
filed six days after the expiration of the three month time limit for setting aside 
judgments under that provision. 
Before an order was entered on the motion to set aside, the Toscanos' counsel 
filed a renewed motion to set aside the default judgment. This motion was based upon 
the claims presented on this appeal, namely that the Cross-Claim failed to state a claim, 
Coulter had failed to properly serve the papers, and Coulter and the Trial Court had failed 
to follow the two-step procedure required when a party seeks a default judgment for other 
than a sum certain. 
The Trial Court did not hold a hearing on this motion and instead issued a minute 
entry stating that, because the Cross-Claim did not seek a sum certain, a hearing should 
have been held to determine the amount of damages. The Toscanos, correctly reasoning 
from established precedent that the Trial Court's ruling implied that there was no valid 
judgment in place, filed a motion to set aside the default certificate under the good cause 
standard of Utah R. Civ. P. 55(c). The Trial Court declined to consider whether to set 
9 
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aside the default certificate under Rule 55(c), ruling that, by its minute entry, it had not 
implied that there was no valid judgment in place. 
The Trial Court subsequently held a hearing to determine the amount of 
damages.6 At that hearing the Trial Court struggled to find a cause of action in the 
Cross-Claim. It also was presented with copious evidence demonstrating that Michael 
Toscano was not an owner or principal of Auto One at the time Coulter made the loans in 
question and that Telisa Toscano had never been an owner, principal, or employee of 
Auto One. Nonetheless, the Trial Court entered judgment against the Toscanos in the 
amount of $188,598.62. 
C. Significance Of The Errors Made By Coulter And The Trial Court. 
The Toscanos demonstrated their interest in defending themselves in this case. 
They answered the complaint and opposed summary judgment. They maintained contact 
with their co-defendant, Coulter. Nonetheless, when Coulter made his belated decision to 
seek a default against the Toscanos, he did not make significant efforts to insure that the 
Toscanos were aware he was seeking a default. Rules 5 and 55 require that default 
papers be served on counsel when a party has appeared in the action through counsel 7 
6 A motion to reconsider was filed and heard prior to the hearing on damages. In 
addressing the motion to reconsider, the Trial Court added more detail to its ruling. 
Specifically, in relation to the claim that Coulter had failed to serve the Toscanos, the 
Trial Court stated that the Toscanos were not entitled to service because, though they had 
appeared through counsel by answering the complaint, they had not appeared for 
purposes of the cross claim. 
7
 Counsel would have been more likely than the Toscanos to understand the significance 
of a default being sought against his clients. 
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The procedure chosen by Coulter not only failed to comport with the Rules, it also failed 
to provide timely notice to the Toscanos. 
Coulter and the Trial Court compounded this problem by failing to hold a hearing 
prior to entry of a default judgment. Had they followed this process, the Toscanos would 
have been entitled to notice of hearing on the default judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 
5(a)(2)(C). This notice would have allowed them to seek to have the default certificate 
set aside under Rule 55(c) before a judgment was entered. 
When the Trial Court was informed of its error in failing to hold a hearing, it 
attempted to correct the matter by holding a hearing. However, it treated the judgment as 
if it were still valid and immune from challenge under Rules 55(c) and 60(b)(1). In 
effect, the Trial Court entered a judgment before holding a hearing. This approach 
violates Rule 55. 
This procedure was also unfair. Coulter's improper service had already deprived 
the Toscanos of notice he was seeking a default before it was entered. By entering a 
judgment before holding a hearing, the Court deprived them of another opportunity (to 
which they were entitled by the Rules) to contest the default judgment before it was 
entered. 
The Toscanos had originally missed, by only six days, the three-month deadline 
for seeking to have the default judgment set aside under the excusable neglect standard of 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). Had Coulter properly served the default papers, or had the 
Court held a hearing before entering a default judgment, the Toscanos would have known 
of the default before it was entered and could have challenged it under the "good cause" 
11 
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standard of Rule 55(c). At a bare minimum, they would have been entitled to have their 
motion to set aside addressed under the "mistake or excusable neglect" standard of Utah 
R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). 
D. The Judgment Is Void Because the Cross Claim Fails To State A 
Claim. 
Lastly, procedural issues aside, the inadequacy of the Cross-Claim cannot be 
overlooked. It simply does not state a claim against the Toscanos. If the Trial Court was 
inclined to liberally construe the Cross-Claim, it should have, at the very least, considered 
the evidence to determine whether a default judgment was proper based upon the Cross-
Claim. A promissory note presented by Coulter to the Trial Court before he sought the 
default demonstrated that his loan had been to Pedro Boix, not the Toscanos. Evidence 
presented at the default judgment hearing demonstrated that Michael Toscano was not 
involved with Auto One at the relevant times and that Coulter's wife was involved with 
the company at that time. Perhaps most tellingly, the evidence showed that Telisa 
Toscano had never been involved with Auto One and that Coulter knew she was not so 
involved. Nonetheless, the Trial Court chose to disregard this evidence and entered a 
default judgment against both Michael and Telisa Toscano. In doing so, the Trial Court 
deliberately ignored the power granted to it by Utah R. Civ. P. 55 to "to establish the 
truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter," prior 
to entering a default judgment. This failure to consider the pleadings and the facts to 




STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Western Surety Company initiated this lawsuit by filing a complaint against 
Nathan Coulter, Sandra Coulter, Michael Toscano, Telisa Toscano and others on April 
12, 2005. Trial Court Record ("Rec") 1-9. The complaint asserted claims interpleading 
amounts Western Surety owed under a bond and seeking indemnification of those 
amounts from Nathan Coulter, Sandra Coulter and the Toscanos. However, the substance 
of those claims is not relevant to this appeal. 
2. An amended complaint was filed on May 9, 2005. Rec. 40-48. 
3. The Toscanos answered the amended complaint filed against them in this 
matter on June 10,2005. Rec. 104-109. 
4. D. Bruce Oliver appeared as attorney of record for the Toscanos when he 
answered the amended complaint on their behalf. Id. 
5. D. Bruce Oliver never filed a notice of withdrawal as the Toscanos' 
counsel. See, generally, docket for Western Surety Co. v. Idaho Auto Auction, et al, Civil 
No. 050906722 and Trial Court Record. 
6. Coulter answered the amended complaint on July 1, 2005, and submitted 
with his answer the Cross-Claim against the Toscanos. Rec. 112-123. 
7. Coulter's Cross-Claim is contained on the final two pages of an eleven page 
document, and the heading of the document gives no indication the Cross-Claim is 
directed at the Toscanos. Rec. 112 & 120-122. 
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8. The Cross-Claim, which was not submitted pro se? consists of eleven 
numbered paragraphs and does not contain titles listing the causes of action being 
pursued. Rec. 120-122. 
9. The Cross-Claim alleges, in paragraph 6, that Coulter previously made a 
demand on Auto One for "breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and fraud." However, 
in paragraph 7 it alleges losses resulting from "breach of contract, conversion and fraud." 
Rec. 121. 
10. The Cross Claim does not describe any misrepresentation supporting a 
fraud claim. Rec. 120-122. 
11. The Cross Claim references loans made to Auto One. Rec. 121, |^ 4. 
12. Though the introductory sentence of the Cross Claim refers to Pedro Boix, 
Sylvia Boix, Michael Toscano and Telisa Toscano as "the Auto One Principals", Coulter 
has not plead that they actually were principals of Auto One at the time he made his loan 
to Auto One. Rec. 120-122. 
13. The Cross-Claim does not state the amount loaned under any contract, and 
instead states only that Coulter loaned "certain sums of money to Auto One." Rec. 121. 
14. The Toscanos and Coulter both filed memoranda contesting summary 
judgment sought by the plaintiff. Rec. 210-218 & 241-252. 
15. On December 4, 2006, this Court entered an order granting summary 




16. Satisfaction of Western Surety 5s judgments against the Toscanos and 
Coulter were entered on August 2 and August 13, 2007, respectively. Rec. 535-540. 
17. Shortly before those satisfactions of judgment were entered, Coulter and 
Michael Toscano discussed potentially working together to satisfy Western Surety's 
judgments against them. During these conversations, Coulter did not mention his 
lingering Cross-Claim against the Toscanos.8 Rec. 610, |^ 5. 
18. In a pleading filed with the Trial Court on November 13, 2006, before he 
sought to default the Toscanos, Coulter had submitted a copy of the contract evidencing 
his loans to Auto One, which reflected the loan was to be repaid by Pedro Boix and not 
the Toscanos. Rec. 455. He also submitted checks written to him from "Pedro Boix dba 
Auto One." Rec. 457. None of these documents referenced the Toscanos. 
19. On January 17, 2008 Coulter mailed a default certificate and default 
judgment (the "default papers") to 9738 South Tayside Dr. in South Jordan, Utah in an 
apparent attempt to serve those documents on the Toscanos. Rec. 568-569.9 
20. Coulter did not attempt to serve the default papers on the Toscanos' counsel 
of record, D. Bruce Oliver. Rec. 568-569; see also Coulter's Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Disposition ("Coulter's Supp. Mem."), filed with this Court on or 
about August 19, 2009, p. 3. 
° Michael Toscano alleged this fact, and other relevant facts, in his second affidavit. 
None were challenged in by Coulter before the Trial Court, despite numerous 
opportunities to do so, including the opportunity to cross exam Mr. Toscano during the 
June 16, 2009 hearing. June 16, 2009 Hearing Trans, Rec. 1033, p. 63. 
9
 The Toscanos believe the default papers were initially submitted to the Trial Court on 
January 17, 2008, however the record is unclear. 
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21. The Toscanos did not reside at 9738 S. Tayside Dr. in January of 2008 and 
the default papers mentioned were not forwarded to them. Rec. 611, ^  11. 
22. The Trial Court entered a default certificate on February 4, 2008 and a 
default judgment in the amount of $73,880.00 on February 6, 2008. Rec. 577-578 & 583-
585. 
23. The Toscanos did not receive the default papers until late March or early 
April of 2008. Rec. 611, Tj 10. The papers he received were unsigned. Rec. 615. 
24. Miscommunications between the Toscanos and their counsel, uncertainty 
regarding the nature of the default judgment, Coulter's counsel's failure to return a call 
from the Toscanos' counsel, and the Toscanos being out of communication with their 
attorneys for the week of May 5-9, 2008 delayed the Toscanos9 response to the motion to 
dismiss. Rec. 611, ffl[ 11-14; Rec. 615, T\\ 4-7. 
25. On May 12, 2008, three months and six days after entry of the default 
judgment, the Toscanos filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, arguing, in part, 
that, because their counsel never forwarded the Cross-Claim to them, they had no notice 
of it. Rec. 586-597. 
26. During a hearing on July 23, 2008 the Trial Court indicated it would deny 
this motion, reasoning in part that the motion should have been brought under Utah R. 
Civ. P. 60(b)(1) rather than 60(b)(6) and that it was therefore time-barred because it was 
filed six days late. Rec. 639. 
27. On July 25, 2008, the Toscanos filed a Renewed Motion to Set Aside 
Default Judgment (the "Renewed Motion"). In this motion they asserted as grounds for 
16 
setting aside the default that: (1) Coulter and his counsel had failed to follow the Rules 
of Civil Procedure by failing to serve the default papers upon the Toscanos5 counsel, 
despite the fact that the Toscanos were not in default for failure to appear; (2) Coulter 
failed to follow the Rules of Civil Procedure by failing to apply for a default judgment 
after entry of the default certificate due to the fact that the Cross-Claim was not for a sum 
certain; (3) The Court failed to hold a hearing to determine the amount of the default 
judgment, rendering the judgment invalid; and (4) the default judgment was invalid 
because it failed to state a claim against the Toscanos. Rec. 640-656. 
28. On August 1, 2008, the Trial Court entered an order denying the original 
motion to set aside default. Rec. 670-672. 
29. No hearing was held on the Renewed Motion. However, in a minute entry 
dated September 24, 2008, the Trial Court held "[GJiven that the amount sought by Mr. 
Coulter was not for a sum certain, in accordance with Rule 55(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the Court finds a hearing on the issue of damages is necessary.5' Rec. 
746. 
30. Because this ruling carried with it the conclusion that the default judgment 
was not valid, the Toscanos filed a motion to set aside the default certificate based upon 
the good cause standard of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c). The grounds asserted in 
that motion were that (1) the Cross Claim failed to state a claim; and (2) the default was 
17 
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the result of mistakes by the Toscanos' former counsel and failures to follow the Rules of 
Civil Procedure by Coulter's counsel. Rec. 750-761. 
31. On November 13, 2008, the Trial Court heard the Motion to Set Aside the 
Default Certificate. Rec. 836, November 13, 2004 Hearing Trans. 
32. In an Order dated December 8, 2008, the Trial Court ruled that, although it 
had failed to hold a hearing to determine damages prior to entry of the Default Judgment 
in its September 23, 2008 Minute Entry, it had not intended to set aside the Default 
Judgment as to liability but had only intended to recognize that a hearing was necessary 
to determine damages. Therefore, it directed the clerk and counsel to determine a hearing 
date. Rec. 838-839, H 2 & 5. 
33. The Toscanos subsequently submitted a motion for reconsideration, 
requesting that the Trial Court reconsider its determination that, although it had not held a 
hearing on damages, the default judgment remained valid and could not be set aside. 
Rec. 828-835. 
34. On April 27, 2009 the Trial Court heard the motion for reconsideration and 
ruled that though the Toscanos had appeared in the case by answering the Complaint, 
"they have not appeared in the cross-claim," and were "not entitled to be served." Rec. 
921. April 27, 2009 Hearing Transcript, Rec. 921, pp. 34-35. On this basis, the Trial 




35. The Court held a hearing on June 16, 2009 to determine the amount of 
damages for the default judgment. See Rec. 1033, June 16, 2009 Hearing Trans. 
36. At that hearing the Toscanos submitted a memorandum arguing that, due to 
the deficiencies in the Cross-Claim and in light of the related underlying facts, the Court 
should set damages at zero dollars. Rec. 978-985. The Toscanos requested, in light of 
the deficiencies in the Cross-Claim and the evidence in the record indicating that the 
Toscanos cannot be held liable for the debts that were alleged, that the Trial Court expand 
the scope of the July 9, 2009 hearing on damages, and consider whether the Toscanos 
could be held liable for the debts of Auto One at issue. Id.; see also June 19, 2009 
Hearing Trans., Rec. 1033, pp. 124-128. 
37. During the hearing on June 16, 2009, the Toscanos presented evidence to 
demonstrate that: 
a. Nathan Coulter ("Coulter") loaned the money that is the subject of 
his cross-claim to Pedro Boix and that Pedro Boix guaranteed Coulter that this money 
would be repaid (Rec. 927 and Rec. 103310 pp. 41-44); 
b. At the time of this loan, Michael Toscano had resigned as a member 
of Auto-One (the company to which Coulter alleges he loaned the money) (pp. 55-56); 
1{J
 Rec. 1033 is the June 19, 2009 hearing transcript. 
19 
651 :417557v3 
c. Telisa Toscano's only association with Auto One was being married 
to Michael Toscano, and Coulter had never met Telisa Toscano,1 1 (Rec. 1035, pp. 50 and 
100); 
d. Coulter knew (or, in light of the evidence, should have known), 
when making the loan to Auto-One, that the Toscanos were not members of that 
company at that time; therefore (See Rec. 1033, pp. 38-51 and 61). 
38. During the hearing on June 16, 2009, the Trial Court acknowledged that it 
was difficult to determine the causes of action being pursued, stating "One should not 
have to guess, I suppose, what causes of action are actually alleged in the Complaint, 
quite frankly." June 19, 2009 Hearing Trans., Rec. 1033, p. 23. The Trial Court then 
noted that "there seems to be no disagreement, however, that the cross-claim alleges 
breach of contract," and that "[the Court] will need to make a decision as to what are the 
causes of action alleged in the cross claim." Id. 
39. Nonetheless, at the conclusion of that hearing, the Court ruled that liability 
had been conclusively established by the default and entered damages in the amount of 
$188,598.62. Rec. 973, ffi| 1-3. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There are four flaws inherent in the default judgment at issue. Each provides a 
separate ground for reversal of the Trial Court's decision not to set aside the default 
11 The only evidence offered by Coulter of Telisa Toscano's involvement in Auto One 
was that she was a signer on the Western Surety Bond. Rec. 50. Mr. Coulter also admits 
he signed a similar bond but denies he was an owner of Auto One. Rec. 51. 
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judgment at issue. Three of the flaws in the judgment (numbered (1), (2), and (4), below) 
relate to the procedure followed by Coulter and the Trial Court. The fourth flaw (number 
(3), below) is simply that the default is void because it is based upon a cross-claim that 
fails to state a claim against the Toscanos. The four grounds for setting aside the default 
judgment are: 
(1) Coulter failed to follow the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in seeking the 
default certificate and the default judgment by failing to serve the default papers on the 
Toscanos' counsel when Coulter first sought the default by filing those documents with 
the Trial Court. This failure renders the default invalid. The Trial Court incorrectly ruled 
that Coulter was not required to serve the default papers on the Toscanos because, though 
the Toscanos had answered the complaint and appeared in the case, they had not 
appeared for purposes of the Cross-Claim. This holding is reversible error. 
(2) The default judgment was invalid because Coulter and the Trial Court 
failed to follow the two-step process for entry of default judgment set forth in Utah R. 
Civ. P. 55(b)(2). When the Trial Court recognized that it should have held a hearing 
regarding the amount of damages prior to entry of the judgment, it should have also 
recognized that there was no valid judgment in place until such a hearing was held, and 
thus should have considered whether "good cause" exists to set aside the default 
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certificate under Utah R. Civ. P. 55(c). The Court's failure to consider the "good cause" 
standard for setting aside the default certificate was reversible error. 12 
(3) The default is void because it is based upon a cross-claim that failed to state 
a claim against the Toscanos. The Trial Court committed reversible error by finding that 
the Cross-Claim stated a claim for breach of contract against the Toscanos. 
(4) In light of the deficiencies in the Cross-Claim o, including the fact that it 
does not state a claim, the Trial Court should have, at a minimum, considered additional 
facts pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) prior to entering a default judgment. Those 
facts, as demonstrated by the facts shown at the July 19, 2009 hearing, many of which 
were in evidence prior ton the hearing, demonstrated that any doubt regarding the Cross-
Claim should have been resolved against Coulter and in favor of setting aside the 
judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD BE SET ASIDE BECAUSE 
COULTER AND THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW THE 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ENTERING THE DEFAULT 
CERTIFICATE AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT. 
A. Coulter Failed To Follow The Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure In 
Seeking The Default Certificate And The Default Judgment By Failing 
To Serve The Default Papers On The Toscanos9 Counsel. 
12 The facts of this case meet the requirements of the "good cause" standard found in 
Rule 55(c). This Court could remand the case for consideration of whether the default 
certificate should be set aside under the good cause standard. However, because that 
standard is low, and because the facts, including Coulter's failure to properly serve the 
default papers as stated in section I C, below, clearly demonstrate that good cause exists 
to set aside the default certificate, this Court can and should simply set aside both the 
default judgment and the default certificate. 
AQ1 •AMKZ-Jul 
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Coulter's failure to give notice to the Toscanos' counsel prior to entry of the 
judgment as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 5(a)(2) and (b)(1) deprived the Toscanos of 
notice of the impending default, denying them due process and rendering the default 
certificate and judgment void. If this flaw is ignored, then the Rules of Civil Procedure 
become mere suggestions. Parties seeking a default would be encouraged to behave 
surreptitiously in seeking defaults and to provide any required notice in the manner least 
likely to apprise the other party that a default was being sought. 
1. The Trial Court erred by ruling that a party who has appeared 
by answering the complaint has not appeared for purposes 
related to a cross-claim in the same action. 
The Trial Court incorrectly ruled that, though the Toscanos had appeared in the 
case by answering the Complaint, "they have not appeared in the cross-claim." An 
appearance is an indication 'in some way [of] an intent to pursue a defense;' it is ca 
relatively low threshold.' New York Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 142 (5th Cir. 
La. 1996)(citation omitted). When deciding which parties have appeared and are thus 
entitled to notice, our Supreme Court distinguishes between a party who has "elected to 
participate at some level in an action" (emphasis added) and "a party who has declined to 
participate in any regard by simply ignoring previous notice given in the form of the 
complaint." Lund v. Brown, 11 P.3d 277, 282 (Utah 2000); see also Plaza del Lago 
Townhomes Ass'n v. HighwoodBuilders, LLC, 148 P.3d 367, 370 (Colo. Ct. App. 
2O06)(finding that one appears when one engages in conduct "sufficient to indicate to the 
trial court that the defendant had an interest in participating in the litigation"). 
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In Lund v. Brown, the Supreme Court ruled that a party who has filed a complaint, 
but not answered a counterclaim, has appeared in the action and thus is entitled to 
service. Id. at 281-283. When service is not properly made upon a party who has 
appeared in accordance with Utah R. Civ. P. 5, the default should be set aside. Id. There 
is no basis for distinguishing between failure to answer a cross claim and failure to 
answer a counter claim. If a party has participated in the litigation, it has appeared. 
The position of Coulter and the Trial Court that appearance in the action by 
answering the complaint does not constitute appearance for the purposes of a cross-claim 
is illogical. Utah R. Civ. P. 5(a)(1) provides that, with limited exceptions, every paper 
filed in the lawsuit "shall be served upon each of the parties." However, according to 
Coulter and the Trial Court, default papers related to a cross-claim need not be served 
upon a party who has answered the complaint but failed to answer a cross-claim. This 
position creates the absurd result that, where a defendant/cross-defendant has answered a 
complaint but failed to answer a cross-claim, that party is entitled to service of every 
paper, except for papers through which the cross-claimant seeks a default against the 
cross-defendant. Though parties who are not directly involved in the cross-claim (i.e. the 
plaintiff) would be entitled to notice that the cross-claimant seeks a default against the 
cross-defendant, the cross-defendant himself would be denied such notice. 
Moreover, the risk that a cross-defendant will not be aware of a cross-claim is 
greater than the risk that a defendant will not be aware of a complaint. A defendant is 
entitled to service of a complaint and summons under Utah R. Civ. P. 4. This notice is 
crucial to our concept of due process, as it highly likely to insure notice. However, a 
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cross-claim may be served upon counsel under Rule 5(b)(1). In multi-party litigation, 
counsel often receives numerous papers relating only to other parties. Particularly where, 
as here, the heading of the Cross-Claim does not mention the Cross-Defendant by name, 
there is a risk that counsel will overlook the Cross-Claim (as happened here). If counsel 
is entitled to no other notice of the cross-claim or an impending default prior to its entry, 
then a party may have liability established against it prior to ever having received actual 
notice of the cross-claim. In short, the rule and procedure advocated by Coulter and the 
Trial Court are grossly unfair and greatly increase the risk that a party who has, in good 
faith, undertaken involvement with a lawsuit will learn, after the fact, that due to a simple 
oversight by counsel, a default has been entered against it. The Court should decline 
adopt the absurd and unfair position advocated by Coulter and the Trial Court. 
2. Coulter failed to follow Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 5 which 
requires that all papers be served upon counsel for a party who 
has appeared in the case through counsel. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 5(a)(1) requires that every motion, demand and 
similar paper must be served upon each party. Rule 5(a)(2)(B) requires that all pleadings 
and papers be served upon a party in default for any reason other than failure to appear. 
Rule 5(b)(1) requires that, if a party is represented by an attorney, service must be made 
upon the attorney. 
Coulter did not serve his papers requesting default upon the Toscanos5 counsel of 
record, D. Bruce Oliver. When Coulter, either by mistake or by design, sent the 
documents to a residential address for the Toscanos rather than to their counsel, he bore 
the risk that his notice would be ineffective or untimely. 
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The rule requiring service upon counsel for a party who has appeared exists for 
good reasons. A client may relocate without notifying the court of his new address. A 
client may not realize the significance of a proposed default; he may not know the best 
strategies for avoiding its entry; he may assume his attorney has received the documents 
and is prepared to handle the situation; or he may not realize that the document has 
actually been filed and requires action. 
Coulter's error resulted in the Toscanos receiving the documents in late March or 
early April of 2008, at least three months after the documents were filed with the Trial 
Court and approximately one to two months after entry of default judgment. Therefore, 
the Toscanos were, in fact, deprived of any notice of an impending default prior to entry 
of a default judgment and never had the opportunity to cure the failure to answer the 
Cross-Claim. 
This failure was compounded by Coulter's counsel failure to follow the Utah 
Standards of Professionalism and Civility. "Lawyers shall not cause the entry of a 
default without first notifying other counsel whose identity is known, unless their clients' 
legitimate rights could be adversely affected." Utah Standards of Professionalism and 
Civility, Rule 16. Had Coulter's counsel observed either the Rules of Civil Procedure or 
the Civility Standard, the Toscanos' counsel would have had notice of a pending default 
prior to its entry and could have sought to avert it by filing an answer and opposing entry 
of the default. 
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3. Coulter's failure to follow Utah R. Civ. P. 5 renders the default 
judgment void and requires that it be set aside. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) requires a court to set aside a judgment that 
is void. Coulter's failure to give notice to the Toscanos' counsel creates a significant 
flaw in the default, rendering it void. Failure to follow the rules of civil procedure 
regarding notice in seeking a default renders the default void. Richins v. Delbert 
Chipman & Sons Co., 817 P.2d 382, 385 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)(noting that a default 
judgment is void "if the court acted in a manner inconsistent with due process"); New 
York Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 143 (5th Cir. La. 1996)(failure to serve default 
papers on party in default is a violation of due process rendering default judgment void); 
Deutz-Allis Credit Corp. v. Smith, 785 P.2d 682, 684 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990)(finding that a 
default judgment is voidable if entered without giving the opposing party requisite notice 
of an application and hearing for default judgment). As mentioned above, in Lund v. 
Brown, Utah's Supreme Court recognized that failure to serve default papers related to a 
counter-claim upon a party who filed a complaint but failed to answer the counter claim 
requires setting aside a default judgment. Id. at 281-283. 
The requirement of service and notice are founded on concerns of due process. 
Under circumstances similar to those in this case, the Fifth Circuit determined the lower 
court erred in refusing to vacate a judgment granted against a party when service of 
notice of a motion for summary judgment did not comply with the requirements found in 
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Rule 5. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 143 (5th Cir. 1996).13 A party 
had appeared in the case, but had a default certificate entered against him for failing to 
answer the complaint. Id. at 140. His co-defendant sought summary judgment on a 
cross-claim made against him, but mailed the summary judgment papers to an invalid 
address. IcL at 140. The trial court entered summary judgment when the party in default 
failed to respond. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that because the defaulting party 
had made an appearance in the case, "he was entitled under Rule 5(a) to service of all 
papers in the suit, including the motion for summary judgment." IdL at 142. Where 
service had been mailed to an invalid address, the mailing did not satisfy the notice 
requirements of Rule 5. Id. The judgment was void because the defaulting party lacked 
notice of the impending judgment and was denied due process. Id. at 143. 
Accordingly, the court ruled that the lower court "erred in refusing the [sic] vacate 
the judgment under Rule 60(b)(4)." Id. The judgment was set aside, though the default 
certificate, which apparently had been properly served by the original plaintiff, remained 
in place. In the instant case, there is no question that Coulter failed to properly serve both 
the request for a default certificate and the request for a default judgment. Thus both 
should be set aside. 
13 Utah's Supreme Court has relied on New York Life in prior decisions, noting that "The 
federal interpretation [of Rule 5] is persuasive in light of the fact that our rule 5 is 
"substantially similar" to federal rule 5." Lund v. Brown, 11 P.3d 277, 283 (Utah 2000). 
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B. The Default Judgment Was Invalid Because Coulter and the Trial 
Court Failed To Follow The Two-Step Process For Entry Of Default 
Judgment Set Forth In Utah R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). 
UA default judgment is a two-step process. . . . If a party fails to plead or 
otherwise defend, the clerk of the court makes an entry of default. After the clerk makes 
the entry of default, the nondefauking party must move to have default judgment entered. 
[In cases in which the judgment is not for a sum certain] the nondefauking party must 
apply to the court for an entry of default judgment". Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 
P.2d 932, 940 (Utah 1998). The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that a judgment entered 
without following this two step process must be reversed. Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 
1193, 1196 (Utah 1984); see also Deutz-Allis Credit Corp. v. Smith, 785 P.2d 682, 684 
(Idaho Ct. App. 1990)(finding that a default judgment is voidable if entered without 
giving the opposing party requisite notice of an application and hearing for default 
judgment). 
It is undisputed that, prior to entering the default judgment, the Trial Court did not 
follow the two-step process for entering a default judgment. It simply entered a default 
judgment for $73,880.00 based upon Coulter's request that it do so, without reviewing 
the Cross-Claim to determine whether it stated a claim or whether it was for a sum 
certain. When the Toscanos pointed out that the Cross-Claim was not for a sum certain, 
the Trial Court recognized that it had erred, but failed to cure its error. Instead, it ruled 
that the default judgment was still in place, and immune from challenge, and 
subsequently held a hearing to determine the amount of damages. 
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Had the Trial Court followed the Rules of Civil Procedure, it would have been 
required to serve notice of a default judgment hearing upon the Toscanos prior to a 
judgment being entered against them. Utah R. Civ. P. 5(a)(2)(C).14 This notice would 
have given the Toscanos an opportunity to seek to have the default certificate set aside 
under Utah R. Civ. P. 55(c) prior to entry of a judgment. Even had it been briefly 
delayed, it would have provided the Toscanos with notice of the default several weeks 
earlier than the first notice they actually received. Given that the Toscanos missed the 
deadline for challenging the default under the "mistake of excusable neglect" standard of 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) by only six days., one must assume that, had they received notice 
of the default four to six weeks earlier, their motion to set aside the default would have 
been filed at least six days earlier than it was, and would have been within the time period 
for setting aside a default judgment under the "mistake or excusable neglect" standard of 
Rule 60(b)(1). 15 
C. The Toscanos Were Prejudiced By The Failure Of Coulter and the 
Trial Court To Follow The Rules Of Civil Procedure. 
Had the Toscanos been given notice of an impending default, they could have 
cured the default prior to entry of the default certificate. Had Coulter served the default 
14 Rule 5(a)(2)(C) applies to all parties, regardless of whether or not they have appeared 
in the case. Therefore, the error under this rule does not hinge on whether the Trial Court 
was incorrect when it ruled that a party who has answered a complaint has not appeared 
for purposes of a cross-claim. 
15 The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
ignoring a similar (though shorter) deadline for vacating judgments found in Idaho's Rule 
60(b) where the party in default was not given required notices prior to the entry of the 
default. Radioear Corp. v. Crouse, 547 P.2d 546, 549 (Idaho 1976). 
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papers on the Toscanos' counsel when he filed them with the Trial Court on January 19, 
2008, the Toscanos would have had until February 6, 2008 (the date the Trial Court 
entered the default and default judgment) to file an answer and avoid entry of the 
default. 16 Even if the Toscanos had responded later, they would have been able to 
challenge the default certificate under the ugood cause" standard of Rule 55(c) prior to 
the hearing to determine damages. At the very least, they would have had significantly 
more time than they had to seek to set aside the default judgment under the "mistake or 
excusable neglect" standard of Rule 60(b)(1). 
The Toscanos could meet both the Rule 55(c) standard and the Rule 60(b)(1) 
standard. The "good cause" standard encompasses those facts that would justify relief 
under the "excusable neglect" standard of Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1); however, "good 
cause" may also be met by facts that do not justify relief under the "excusable neglect" 
standard. See Dennis Garberg & Assocs. v. Pack-Tech Int'l Corp., 115 F.3d 767, 775 
(10th Cir. 1997)("the good cause required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c) for setting aside entry 
of default poses a lesser standard for the defaulting party than the excusable neglect 
which must be shown for relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)"); Sonus 
Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 61 F.R.D. 644, 647 (D. Mass. 1974)("The 
lf>
 As stated in section I.A., above, the default and default certificate are actually void 
due to Coulter's failure to provide notice, so the prejudice is not necessarily relevant. 
The Toscanos identify the prejudice here because it may be relevant if the Court 
determines that the Trial Court's error in entering a judgment before holding a hearing 
can be corrected by remanding to the Trial Court for consideration under the "good 
cause" standard of Rule 55(c). 
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standard for setting aside a final order or a judgment by default is more stringent than that 
for setting aside an entry of default"). 
"[C]ourts generally tend to favor granting relief from default judgments where 
there is any reasonable excuse, unless it will result in substantial prejudice or injustice to 
the adverse party." Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 
544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975). "It is quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of discretion 
to refuse to vacate a default judgment where there is reasonable justification or excuse for 
the defendant's failure to appear, and timely application is made to set it aside." Lund, 11 
P.3d at 280; Helgesen v. Inyangumia, 636 P.2d 1079, 1081 (Utah 1981). Court should 
incline towards granting relief from a default judgment in order to give the parties a 
chance to have their case heard. Helgesen, 636 P.2d at 1081; Heathman v. Fabian & 
Clendenin, 311 P.2d 189, 190 (Utah 1962) ("The courts . . . favor, where possible, a full 
and complete opportunity for a hearing on the merits of every case"). 
In this matter, the Cross-Claim was contained on the final two pages of an eleven 
page document, with no notice in the heading that it was directed against the Toscanos. 
As a result, the Toscanos5 counsel did not see it. This case involved over twelve parties, 
resulting in a large number of documents being filed. In light of all of the circumstances, 
it is understandable that the Toscanos' counsel overlooked these two pages. Default "was 
never intended to be used as a means of disciplining attorneys who may be derelict in the 
performance of their duties." McKean v. Mountain View Memorial Estates, 411 P.2d 
129, 131 (Utah 1966). More importantly, when a party has appeared, he or she should 
not be defaulted without being given some notice of his error and a chance to cure it. See 
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McKean, 411 P.2d at 130 (noting that, where a party has appeared and shown an interest 
in defending, courts should be "somewhat indulgent" in setting aside defaults and 
allowing a case to be decided on the merits). Here, the Toscanos' and their counsel were 
given no notice that a default might be entered until four to six weeks after entry of the 
default judgment. The result is contrary to the Rules of Civil Procedure and is 
discouraged by the Rules of Civility. 
Lastly, under the Rule 60(b) standard, in order to set aside a default judgment the 
moving party must establish that it has a meritorious defense to the claims on which the 
default was based. Lund, 11 P.3d at 283. However, a party need not actually prove its 
proposed defenses in order to show that it has a meritorious defense. Id., citing Erickson 
v. Schenkers Int'lForwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1148 (Utah 1994). As set forth in 
section II. B., below, there is significant evidence in the record that Coulter gave money 
to Pedro Boix, and not to the Toscanos, and that he was not under the impression that the 
Toscanos would be responsible for repaying any of the money given to Boix. In fact, if 
Coulter did in fact make loans to Auto One in June of 2004, the principals and owners of 
Auto One at that time were Pedro Boix and Coulter's wife, Sandra. Thus, not only do the 
Toscanos have a meritorious defense, they are very likely to prevail in this action. 
II. THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT MUST BE SET ASIDE BECAUSE IT IS 
BASED UPON A CROSS CLAIM THAT FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM 
AGAINST THE TOSCANOS. 
A. The Cross Claim Fails To State A Claim Against The Toscanos. 
"A default judgment is valid only if the well-pled facts show that the plaintiff is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Skanchy v. Calcados Ortope SA, 952 P.2d 1071, 
6 5 1 :417557V-? 
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1076 (Utah 1998); Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932, 940 (Utah 1998) 
Stevens v. Collard, 837 P.2d 593, 595 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)( "A trial court asked to 
render a judgment by default must first conclude that the uncontroverted allegations of an 
applicant's petition are, on their face, legally sufficient to establish a valid claim against 
the defaulting party"). Because Coulter's Cross-Claim fails to state a claim against the 
Toscanos, any default judgment based upon it would be invalid. Therefore, the entire 
default must be set aside. 
In his Cross-Claim, Coulter does not state causes of action with any clarity, nor 
does he state sufficient facts to support any causes of action. In paragraph 6 of the Cross-
Claim, he states that he previously made a demand on Auto One for "breach of contract, 
unjust enrichment, and fraud." However, in paragraph 7 he states that he has suffered 
losses resulting from breach of contract, conversion and fraud. He does not otherwise 
address the claims for fraud or conversion. For example, the Cross-Claim contains no 
allegation of "a representation . . . concerning a presently existing material fact which the 
representer . . . either . . . knew to be false, or . . .made recklessly" as required to plead a 
claim of fraud, nor does he identify any specific property that has been converted. See 
Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790, 794 (Utah 1986)(setting forth elements of fraud claim). 
The Trial Court appeared to struggle to find a claim for relief stated in Cross-
Claim. In the end, it arrived at the conclusion that "the cross claim alleges breach of 
contract." However, the Trial Court failed to recognize that, even if the Cross-Claim 
alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for breach of contract against Auto One, it does 
not allege sufficient facts to state a claim against the Toscanos. 
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As the apparent basis for the contract claim, the Cross-Claim states that "Mr. 
Coulter engaged in a commercial transaction whereby he loaned certain sums of money 
to Auto One [emphasis added]." Though Michael and Telisa Toscano are referred to as 
"the Auto One Principals"17 in the opening paragraph of the Cross-Claim, Coulter has 
not pled that they actually were principals of Auto One at the time he made his loan, nor 
has he pled that he loaned any money to or had a contract with "the Auto One 
Principals". Coulter has also failed to allege whether Auto One is a corporation, LLC, 
partnership or other form of business entity. Thus, even if the allegations of the Cross-
Claim were deemed admitted, one still could not know whether the Toscanos would be 
personally liable for any obligation of Auto One. 
Because Coulter does not allege facts that, if taken as true, would entitle him to a 
judgment against the Toscanos, the Cross-Claim fails to state a claim against the 
Toscanos and the default judgment based upon it is invalid. Skanchy, 952 P.2d at 1076. 
B. Even If The Trial Court Were Inclined To Construe The Cross Claim 
To State A Claim Against The Toscanos, It Should Have Considered 
Other Facts Necessary To Insure An Appropriate Judgment. 
To construe the Cross-Claim as stating a claim against the Toscanos requires the 
assumed existence of facts not pled in the Cross-Claim, such as that the Toscanos were 
17 Using a term such as "principals" as shorthand for certain parties cannot be a 
substitute for well-pled allegations of facts demonstrating that they were principals. 
Otherwise, every plaintiff, in order to insure that he could overcome a motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim would simply define the defendants as "the Liable Parties" or 
some similar term in the opening of his complaint in order to overcome any deficiencies 
in the substantive allegations. 
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somehow associated with Auto One at the time Coulter loaned money to it. However, in 
a pleading filed with the Trial Court before he sought to default the Toscanos, Coulter 
had submitted a copy of the contract in question, which reflected that Pedro Boix, not to 
the Toscanos, would repay the loans. Thus, at the time the Trial Court entered the default 
judgment in February of 2008, it had facts in front of it that would cast serious doubts on 
the legitimacy of Coulter's claims. The Toscanos requested, in light of the deficiencies in 
the Cross-Claim and the evidence in the record indicating that the Toscanos cannot be 
held liable for the debts that were alleged, that the Trial Court expand the scope of the 
July 9, 2009 hearing on damages, and consider whether the Toscanos could be held liable 
for the debts of Auto-One at issue. 
Numerous cases, as well as the plain language of Utah R. Civ. P. 55, permit the 
Court to "establish the truth of any averment" or "to make an investigation of any other 
matter" in order to "reach an appropriate and fair resolution in granting a default 
judgment." Utah R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2); Express Recovery Servs. v. Shewell, 111 P.3d 451, 
453 (Utah Ct. App. 2007)(Holding that the trial court was correct in determining during a 
default judgment hearing under Rule 55(b)(2) that it could not enforce a collection 
commission provision because the provision amounted to a contractual penalty). 
McGarvin-Moberly Constr. Co. v. Welden, 897 P.2d 1310, 1314-17 (Wyo. 1995) 
(holding that in a hearing under Rule 55(b)(2) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which corresponds with the Utah rule, a trial court may permit the defaulting party to 
litigate proximate cause and comparative negligence); Burge v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 
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933 P.2d 210 N.M. 1996 (holding a defaulting party may contest the percentage of his 
negligence) (New Mexico's rule for default judgment is identical to U.R.C.P. 55). 
During the hearing to determine damages, the Toscanos introduced evidence that 
Coulter loaned money only to Auto-One, that Telisa Toscano had never been affiliated 
with Auto-One, that Michael Toscano had resigned his position with Auto-One prior to 
Coulter making his loan, and that Coulter's wife (emphasis added) was Pedro Boix's 
partner in Auto-One at the time of the loans in question.^ The Trial Court heard this 
evidence, but ultimately declined to make any determination necessary to insure that the 
judgment it was entering had some basis in fact. Though the Toscanos believe that the 
defects in the Cross-Claim render the default void, at a bare minimum, they required that 
the Trial Court make some investigation into the facts before entering the default 
judgment. The Trial Court's failure to do so was clear error and an abuse of any 
discretion it might possess. 
CONCLUSION 
The Toscanos appeared in this case through counsel, D. Bruce Oliver. As a result 
of submitting themselves to this action, they were entitled to at least two notices before a 
default judgment could be entered against them - notice that Coulter had filed default 
papers and notice that a hearing would be held prior to entry of a default judgment. They 
received neither, and the contention their participation in the action is not an appearance 
1 8
 The Toscanos have requested a transcript of this hearing for the record. To date, no 
transcript has been received. 
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for purposes of the Cross-Claim borders on absurd. Had they received either of these 
required notices, they would have had multiple opportunities to avoid the default. 
Instead, the Toscanos not even learn that default was being sought until one or two 
months after entry of a judgment against them. As a result, they missed the opportunities 
to avoid the default, or to have it set aside under the lenient "good cause" standard of 
Rule 55(c). When the Toscanos finally received notice that Coulter was seeking a 
default, they had to determine whether a default was actually being sought, and to what 
claims it related. They had little time to make this determination and, as a result, they 
barely missed, by six days, the opportunity to oppose it under the slightly more difficult 
standard of Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). 
The Trial Court refused to correct its errors and Coulter's errors which led to the 
default, instead imposing the burden of those errors on the Toscanos. Moreover, when 
confronted with a deficient Cross-Claim and facts highlighting the deficiencies, the Trial 
Court once against forgave Coulter's errors. 
The result of all of the foregoing is a process and judgment that are astoundingly 
unfair to the Toscanos. The Toscanos request that the default be set aside and the case be 
remanded so that they may defend this case on the merits. 
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